// Tests for oatpp-authkit/util/TokenExtract.hpp — exact-name cookie parsing
// (authkit#16 M-1) and isValidIp.

#include "oatpp-authkit/util/TokenExtract.hpp"

#include <cstdio>
#include <string>

namespace {

int g_failures = 0;
#define REQUIRE(expr) do {                                                   \
    if (!(expr)) {                                                           \
        std::fprintf(stderr, "FAIL %s:%d  %s\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, #expr); \
        ++g_failures;                                                        \
    }                                                                        \
} while (0)

using namespace oatpp_authkit;

void test_cookie_exact_name_match() {
    // Basic.
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("session=abc", "session") == "abc");
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("session=abc; other=1", "session") == "abc");
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("other=1; session=abc", "session") == "abc");
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("other=1; session=abc; more=2", "session") == "abc");

    // OWS trimming around the pair and value.
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("a=1;   session=abc  ; b=2", "session") == "abc");

    // The substring trap: a prefixed/suffixed cookie name must NOT match.
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("xsession=evil", "session") == "");
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("notsession=evil", "session") == "");
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("my_session=evil", "session") == "");
    // Attacker plants a sibling cookie before the real one: exact match still
    // returns the genuine session value, not the shadow.
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("xsession=evil; session=real", "session") == "real");
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("session=real; xsession=evil", "session") == "real");

    // Missing / empty.
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("", "session") == "");
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("foo=bar", "session") == "");
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("session=", "session") == "");

    // __Host- prefixed name is matched only as an exact name.
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("__Host-session=tok", "__Host-session") == "tok");
    REQUIRE(cookieValue("__Host-session=tok", "session") == "");
}

void test_session_cookie_token() {
    // Bare `session` name resolves.
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("session=abc") == "abc");
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("other=1; session=abc; more=2") == "abc");

    // Regression: the `__Host-session` hardened name must also resolve — the
    // exact-name parse (M-1) otherwise silently 401s consumers that renamed
    // their session cookie to `__Host-session`.
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("__Host-session=tok") == "tok");
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("other=1; __Host-session=tok") == "tok");
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("__Host-session=tok; x=1") == "tok");

    // The bare name is preferred when both are somehow present.
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("session=real; __Host-session=other") == "real");

    // Substring traps still don't match either recognised name.
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("x__Host-session=evil") == "");
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("xsession=evil") == "");
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("") == "");
    REQUIRE(sessionCookieToken("foo=bar") == "");
}

void test_is_valid_ip() {
    REQUIRE(isValidIp("192.168.1.1"));
    REQUIRE(isValidIp("::1"));
    REQUIRE(isValidIp("2001:db8::1"));
    REQUIRE(!isValidIp("192.168.1.256"));
    REQUIRE(!isValidIp("1.1.1.1; rm -rf"));
    REQUIRE(!isValidIp(""));
    REQUIRE(!isValidIp(std::string(46, 'a')));   // over length cap
}

} // namespace

int main() {
    test_cookie_exact_name_match();
    test_session_cookie_token();
    test_is_valid_ip();
    std::printf("%s (%d failures)\n", g_failures ? "FAIL" : "OK", g_failures);
    return g_failures ? 1 : 0;
}